The very fact in order to provide the same institutional function it does not need a particular institutional form. Likewise a particular institutional form can deliver completely different functions in various country contexts. This concern shows that appearance can be deceptive. The distinction between formal and informal institutions illustrates this concern. Where easily observable formal institutions (f.e. written regulations) come at odds with less tangible informal institutions (f.e. customs and traditions) it might be very hard to enforce formal institutions. For instance, a reformed legal and regulatory framework governing the exploitation of whichever kind of natural resource can give rise to social conflicts if isn’t suitable for prevailing informal institutions, for example customary land use practices on which subsistence livelihoods are sustained.
If focus is narrowly positioned on particular types of institutional forms, it can also undermine institutional diversity. Blue prints and best practice models that have guided institutional reforms across many developing countries, have tended to disregard that some formal institutional solutions work nicely in certain contexts but are unsuitable for other people. So if transferring particular types of institutions across countries doesn’t guarantee the expected functions materialize, this suggests that it’s not wholly irrelevant to think about how institutions relate to context characteristics and if the formal institutions of a country political-administrative system are internally consistent. For example, weak horizontal checks and balances in certain democracies may be due that political systems have been modeled along a presidential system whereas administrative set-ups have still retained options that come with a Westminster type democracy. New formal institutions may also have ignored older but persistent informal political institutions, for example traditional authorities at sub-national levels. Fiscal decentralization programs have sometimes completely ignored the latter.
Another example where the adoption of special formal institutions has not achieved consistent results may be the knowledge about natural resource funds. Despite them being at the top the to-do-list for emerging mineral-rich country,it had been found that on average natural resource funds don’t contribute to better fiscal policy. They claim that political economy problems lie in the supply of the problem and propose further research to identify additional institutional solutions.
Lastly, OECD countries show that institutional diversity across countries isn’t a hindrance to achieving similar economic and social outcomes. Of these countries it is well researched that diverging institutional matrices deliver similar results, including regarding social policy. They also indicate the significance of institutional compatibility across sectors and across a political-administrative system.
Some types of institutions have obtained more attention than others, suggesting that they are more essential. Much emphasis continues to be positioned on the stability of property rights as a condition for economic growth. The actual argument has been that without asserted property rights economic agents face inhibitive uncertainties about whether investments undertaken today will create the expected future returns that render current sacrifices worthwhile. Put simply, if economic actors are uncertain about retaining increases using their efforts, they are unlikely to attempt potentially beneficial investments.
However, the emphasis on property rights has ignored that the property rights system comprises an entire group of institutions that does not easily aggregate. Promoters from the property rights argument have been able to pick and choose which and whose property rights they deem to be most important. It is argued that institutional reforms in developing countries have often focused on strengthening the home rights for a narrow group of economic actors, while for that wider public property rights have remained poorly defined. Those away from ‘bell jar’ cannot increase their productivity as their lack of minimally secure rights undermines the provision of collateral and thus use of savings.
Linked to the focus on the stability of property rights can also be the assumption that stronger protection of private property rights is always better. But although some protection of property rights is invariably absolutely and indisputably necessary, this does not mean that stronger protection is in fact always better. Changes to and also the creation of new property rights together with alterations in technology, population density or political balances of power have historically been good for economic growth. Examples include historical research on the emergence of mineral rights in the American west.
Harder would be to acknowledge the truth that changes to property rights leading to economic progress come with huge social costs. Numerous studies on agrarian change and industrialisation have made this point. In the European context these studies have contributed to understanding differences and similarities within the growth and development of social safety nets along with other social policy features. In principle this points to a potential transformative role that social policies can enjoy poor exploiting mineral wealth and earning cash.
The ‘success story’ thus remains less about providing incentives for private investors. It’s about the political ability of the nation leadership to build state institutions that have provided an effective infrastructure for advancing economic and social development.